The Minns government presents its proposed expansion of digital surveillance powers as a necessary response to organised crime, but the big issue isn’t whether NSW Police should investigate criminal networks; it’s whether police should be able to access mobile phones without the judicial safeguards that prevent legitimate investigations from going into state overreach.
A smartphone is an intimate record of a person’s life, containing private messages, photographs, financial and health information, location histories, internet searches and connections to hundreds of other people, if not thousands. Giving police easier access through Digital Evidence Access Orders – and forcing people to hand over their passwords and PINs – will expose far more than whatever is needed for a police investigation.
Extraordinary police powers, initially justified as measures against the most serious criminals, have gradually become normalised and extended to protesters, journalists and political activists. Premier Chris Minns, whose NSW Labor government has already pursued restrictive protest laws, is now expanded facial-recognition capabilities and is facing questions over the collection and retention of surveillance data.
The role of Israeli digital-forensics company Cellebrite also raises some serious questions. Its phone-extraction technology has been used against journalists, activists and political figures internationally, demonstrating why strong warrants, independent oversight and enforceable rules governing data retention and destruction are absolutely essential.
As technology becomes more powerful, democratic safeguards should become stronger, and not be swept aside. How much power should the state acquire in the name of security, and who will protect the public once that power begins to spread?
