Malcolm Turnbull’s description of AUKUS as a “colossal mistake” is becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss. Australia is committing hundreds of billions of dollars to a nuclear submarine program that depends on almost everything going right across three countries, several decades and a succession of governments – while leaving many of the decisive choices in American and British hands.
The risks go far beyond cost overruns and construction delays. Australia now needs to keep its ageing Collins-class submarines operational for at least another decade, establish an entirely new nuclear industry, train specialised crews, acquire used Virginia-class submarines from the United States and eventually build British-designed SSN-AUKUS vessels in Adelaide.
Yet America is struggling to produce enough submarines for its own navy, Britain’s shipbuilding industry is in “disarray”, and US law allows an American president to withhold submarines if their transfer is contrary to US military interests. Australia could spend billions reorganising its defence forces and expanding American facilities, only to discover that the promised submarines will never be available.
This is what makes AUKUS more than a terrible defence procurement program: it’s an enormous transfer of control away from Australia.
At least the cancelled French submarine agreement gave us a clearer delivery path and greater national autonomy. AUKUS has replaced that relative certainty with a grand bet on American production, British capacity and geopolitical assumptions that might end up looking completely different by the 2040s.
From 2027, American nuclear-powered submarines are expected to rotate through HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, supported by extensive infrastructure, contractors and thousands of US personnel and dependants, and this will be a de facto permanent American military base on Australian soil. And reversing this will end up becoming politically and economically almost impossible.
Okinawa offers a warning about how foreign military infrastructure can become deeply embedded despite sustained community opposition. Of course, Western Australia is not Okinawa, but similar questions arise about housing pressure, public services, environmental contamination, nuclear safety, military accidents and the conduct of foreign personnel.
There is also a bigger danger: if US military actions are launched from Australian territory during a conflict with one of our neighbours, can an Australian government genuinely refuse to participate? And would HMAS Stirling then become a military target?
Despite the extraordinary financial, environmental and national-security consequences, there has been no meaningful democratic debate. Bipartisan support has inoculated AUKUS from proper scrutiny, while its full costs and obligations will emerge long after the politicians who have created this mess have left political life.
By then, Australia will discover that it hasn’t acquired greater security at all, but locked future generations into an expensive military structure they never approved and will never be able to escape from.
